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I. Introduction 
  There is broad consensus and growing concern that humans are transforming the Earth’s 
natural environment.  This transformation has the potential to impact humanity as we depend 
upon the natural environment for the provision of ecosystem services.  Thus, efforts to 
understand anthropogenic shifts in ecosystem service provision have increased in prominence, as 
have explorations of policies targeting ecosystem service provision.  In this paper we consider 
the optimal design of policy aimed at increasing the provision of these services from privately 
held land.  In particular, we examine the possibility of optimal decision-making hierarchies 
among government agencies targeting ecosystem service provision.  To that end we adapt the 
theoretical model of hierarchy design developed by Hart and Moore (2005). 
  The issue of ecosystem service provision has increasingly attracted the international 
spotlight in recent years due in no small part to its prominence in the Millennium Ecosystem 
Assessment (MA).  The U.N. initiated the MA in order to better understand the impacts on 
humans of changing ecosystems and to explore the possibilities for mitigating those changes and 
impacts.  Ecosystem change impacts humans through changes in the provision of ecosystem 
services, defined broadly as the benefits people obtain from ecosystems.  The MA explicitly 
breaks down ecosystem services into four categories: provisioning services, such as food, fuel, 
fiber, water, and genetic resources; regulating services, such as climate, water, and disease 
regulation, water purification, and pollination; cultural services, such as spiritual and religious 
ties, recreation, and aesthetic values; and supporting services, such as soil formation, nutrient 
cycling, and habitat provision (Gutman 2005; Greenfacts Glossary).  According to the MA, 
degradation and unsustainable exploitation presently threaten over 60% of the Earth’s ecosystem 
services with very real implications for global health and standards of living in the future.    - 2 -
Furthermore, both the exploitation of ecosystem services and the growth rate of that exploitation 
have been far higher in recent decades than ever before due to population growth and rising 
standards of living, i.e. consumption (MA 2005). 
  This increasing pressure on ecosystem services has driven thinking on mitigation 
strategies.  Payment for ecosystem services (PES) has emerged as a broad strategy to encourage 
the provision of ecosystem services or, in many cases, to discourage activities that reduce service 
provision.  In economic terms, the inability of agents to capture the full rents of ecosystem 
service provision often results in divergent private and social values of provision.  By creating 
markets for these services, PES arrangements can correct this disincentive and bring provision 
closer to the socially optimal level.  In the context of land, certain uses or management practices 
by land owners enhance service provision but do not benefit the land owner directly.  In other 
words, there is a positive externality associated with these practices.  Payments under PES 
programs provide incentives for owners to adopt practices and increase service provision.   
While a variety of private sector PES schemes have been envisioned and in some cases 
implemented, most large-scale PES programs to date have been implemented by governments 
(Gutman 2005).  In this paper we concern ourselves with PES programs implemented by 
government.  However, rather than focusing on the design and targeting of specific PES 
programs, we examine the optimal design of a hierarchy defining the interaction between various 
government agencies involved in PES schemes.  Specifically, we address the following 
questions.  Should we have multiple agencies focusing on separate ecosystem services or one 
agency coordinating efforts across multiple services?  Should policies be implemented 
nationally, regionally, or locally?  Under what conditions and assumptions does one 
organizational structure stand out as optimal?   - 3 -
We draw on two distinct bodies of literature.  First, a number of studies have examined 
ecosystem services and conservation spending.  Costanza et al. (1997) and Daily (1997) 
emphasize the tremendous contribution of ecosystem services to the global economy, while de 
Groot, Wilson, and Boumans (2002) highlight the challenges associated with quantifying and 
monetizing that contribution.  Egoh et al. (2007) document the increasing prominence of 
ecosystem services as a criterion for conservation and call for the continuation of this trend. 
Within the ecosystem services literature, a large number of studies deal with the targeting 
of conservation spending.  Because of the nature of ecosystem service provision and the often 
complex translation from service provision to realization of benefits, sub-optimal targeting 
strategies likely result in significant social losses.  For example, failure to consider threshold 
effects, spatial linkages, or correlation between alternative benefits could greatly reduce 
efficiency (Wu 2004).   
Ribaudo (1986) points out that conservation efforts traditionally target the onsite resource 
base rather than incorporating the offsite effects, potentially resulting in significant allocative 
inefficiency.  Wu and Boggess (1999) use a theoretical model of two watersheds to demonstrate 
the benefit loss from ignoring threshold effects and correlation.   Wu, Boggess, and Adams 
(2000) and Wu and Skelton-Groth (2002) empirically establish the presence of cumulative 
effects and ecosystem linkages for salmonids in the Pacific Northwest.  Babcock et al. (1997) 
explore the implications of alternative targeting criteria (e.g. benefit-targeting, cost-targeting, 
benefit-cost targeting, etc.) for social benefits.  Wu (2004) addresses the efficiency of 
conservation spending and provides guidance for efficient policy design. 
Each of these papers treats the targeting of conservation spending within a single 
program.  Our study examines the interactions between government agencies and the   - 4 -
implications for the allocative efficiency of multiple conservation programs.  We are interested 
in a hierarchy design (i.e. an allocation of authority over resources among different agencies) that 
maximizes social welfare and draw upon the hierarchy design and organizational structure 
literature.  Specifically, we adopt the theoretical model developed by Hart and Moore (2005) to 
analyze optimal decision-making hierarchies of government agencies responsible for ecosystem 
service protection. 
The model is driven by agents whose ideas about how to best use assets conflict.  In the 
event of conflict, the hierarchy in place determines which agent uses the asset.  The authors are 
able to demonstrate conditions under which certain designs are dominant and others subordinate.  
This work, which focuses on authority within a hierarchy, is distinct from much of the related 
literature, which deals with the transmission of information. 
Following Hart and Moore (2005), we consider a two-date model of decision-making 
consisting of a set of natural resources to be managed and the government agencies charged with 
managing those resources.  We treat resources as parcels of land.  At time zero agencies are 
assigned tasks and authority over resources is delegated.  Tasks consist of thinking about how to 
use a subset of the parcels.  Authority becomes important when multiple agencies have designs 
on the same parcel.   
  Initially, we follow the structure of the Hart and Moore (2005) model quite closely; this 
includes the exposition of the model in section II and the development of results in section III.  
We describe both assumptions and results in the context of policy targeting ecosystem service 
provision on private lands.  Subsequently, we consider how well the model as formulated fits this 
ecosystem services context in section IV.  Specifically, we relax assumption 2, develop an 
alternative specification of the total value function, and discuss its implications.   - 5 -
II. Model 
  Due to positive externalities associated with certain practices, the existing management 
regime on private lands is suboptimal.  Suppose that society has decided to intervene and target 
parcels of private land with PES schemes.  There are m parcels of land, a1,…, am, available for 
targeting and n government agencies, 1,..., n, involved.   Each agency implements its own PES 
program targeting those ecosystem services that fall under its mandate.  There is rivality among 
parcels in that if one agency pays the owner of a parcel to adopt a specific set of management 
practices that owner cannot adopt the practices advocated by another agency.  Furthermore, 
particular agencies may require conservation of a specific set of parcels to generate benefits for 
society.  When multiple agencies have designs on the same parcel, only one can prevail, reducing 
or negating the potential of the other agencies to generate value for society.  We construct a 
model of decision-making to inform the delegation of authority between agencies. 
For simplicity we treat time as discrete and consider only 2 periods, 0 and 1.  At time 1 a 
decision must be made for each parcel.  Specifically, it must be determined whether a particular 
parcel will be included in any of the PES programs and, if so, in which program.  That is, will the 
owner of a parcel be paid, and which management practices will she be paid to adopt?  The 
decisions must be made at time 1, but authority or hierarchy among the agencies is assigned at 
time 0.  Additionally, agencies are assigned tasks at time 0.  A task is defined as achieving a 
specific environmental goal by conserving or protecting a subset of the m parcels.  Each agency 
is assigned only one task, and each task t(Ai) is associated with (and defined by) a subset of the 
parcels,  1 [, , ] im Aa a ⊂ … .  As a result, there are only n tasks and n subsets of parcels in the 
model.  Agency i is assigned task t(Ai) ,  [ ] 1, , in ∈ … .  For example, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife   - 6 -
Service is responsible for the design of conservation programs to protect fish and wildlife, while 
the U.S. forest service is responsible for programs to protect forest resources. 
Also associated with each task is a probability of success, 0< p(Ai)< 1.  By success in this 
context we mean that the agency has an idea about how to achieve its environmental goal by 
using all of the assigned parcels.  Of course, the agency may find itself unable to generate an idea 
with some probability 1- p(Ai).  If the agency both has an idea and is able to implement that idea, 
it generates value to society v(Ai).  As we shall discuss, implementation is contingent on the 
agency having access to all of the parcels in Ai.   
With the basic framework of the model in place, we now discuss assumptions. 
ASSUMPTION 1: Ideas are stochastically independent events.  The model does allow multiple 
agencies to be assigned to the same task, or to consider how to manage the same set of parcels.  
However, this arrangement does not affect the probability of having an idea.  Each agency 
independently has an idea with probability p(Ai).  In other words, there are no synergies across 
agencies from thinking about the same set of parcels.   
ASSUMPTION 2: Regardless of the whether it has an idea, an agency assigned to task t(Ai) can 
only achieve its environmental goal if it has access to all of the parcels in Ai.  There are no 
benefits unless the agency protects all of the parcels assigned.  This is a restrictive assumption 
and not particularly realistic in the context of ecosystem services.  We explore relaxing this 
assumption in section III. 
ASSUMPTION 3: A parcel is eligible for payments from only one agency and adopts the 
management practices prescribed by that agency.  The parcels are rival and scarce, generating 
conflict.  Conflict occurs when multiple agencies have an idea involving the use of the same 
parcel(s).   
ASSUMPTION 4: In the case of conflict, access to parcels is determined by a prearranged 
hierarchy.  For each parcel ak there is a list Lk,  [ ] 1, , kn ∈ … ; this list ranks agencies by authority 
over the parcel.  These lists, specified at time 0, determine the hierarchy of authority over   - 7 -
parcels.  There is no bargaining at time 1.  Furthermore, agency i only appears on list Lk if 
, [1, , ], [1, , ] ki aA k m i n ∈∈ ∈ …… . 
ASSUMPTION 5: An agency with authority over parcel ak but without an idea does not use the 
parcel.  In this case the senior agency defers to the highest-ranking agency on list Lk that does 
have an idea.  Multiple agencies with tasks involving the same parcel(s) do not conflict when 
only one has an idea. 
ASSUMPTION 6: An agency with authority over parcel ak and an idea uses the parcel regardless 
of access to other parcels necessary for the generation of value from its assigned task.  Clearly 
this could lead to inefficiencies, as it could prevent an agency further down the list from 
generating value. 
ASSUMPTION 7: At time 0 tasks are assigned and the hierarchy established to maximize 
expected value at time 1.  We are implicitly assuming that the probabilities of success and the 
values generated in the instance of success are known at time 0 for each task. 
ASSUMPTION 8: All agencies are capable of carrying out all tasks.  This assumption is not 
unreasonable if we think of agencies recruiting staff with the expertise necessary to complete 
any task. 
With the model assumptions appropriately defined, we now move on to the definition of 
the date 0 expected value function.  We must first develop one further idea.  Based on the lists Lk 
we can formulate a set Si for each agency which consists of those agencies which can trump 
agency i in terms of authority over any of the parcels in Ai, all of which are needed to generate 
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In order for agency i to generate value v(Ai), no agency included in the set Si must have an idea, 
for otherwise agency i would be lacking at least one parcel  ki aA ∈ .  So the expected value   - 8 -
generated by agency i is the probability of an idea p(Ai) times the probability that no agency in Si 
has an idea times the value v(Ai).  It is important to note that this assumes ex ante knowledge of 
the probabilities and value at time 0.  For the total expected value at time 0, we simply sum 
across n agencies. 
1





Vp A p A v A
= ∈
⎧⎫ ⎪⎪ ⎡⎤ =− ⎨⎬ ⎣⎦ ⎪⎪ ⎩⎭ ∑ ∏      (1) 
III. Results 
  Hart and Moore (2005) use this model to develop a number of results with implications 
for optimal hierarchy design.  Their result development begins with simplified specific cases and 
moves to more general cases.  In this section we follow this development and discuss the results 
in our ecosystem services context.   
Two Agencies.  
   We begin with the simple case of two agencies with tasks t(A1) and t(A2).  Initially, we 
consider task selection as exogenous; that is, we ignore the assignment of tasks at time 0.  Define 
set 12 AA A =∩≠ ∅ .  The non-empty intersection provides the potential for conflict.  There is at 
least one parcel that both agencies need to complete their tasks.  In the event that only one 
agency has an idea, there is no conflict, since by assumption 5 an agency with no idea does not 
use any parcels.  However, in the event that both agencies have an idea, the agencies conflict, 
and we need a hierarchy to establish which agency uses each of the parcels in A.  In the two 
agency case, there are only three possible hierarchies.  First, agency 1 could be senior to agency 
2 all parcels in A.  Second, agency 2 could be senior on all parcels.  Finally, assuming there are 2 
or more elements in A, each agency could be senior on one or more parcels.  We refer to this 
situation as a crisscross hierarchy.   - 9 -
Note that the model structure rules out both agencies generating value when A is non-
empty.  If both agencies have an idea, at most one agency will be able to implement its idea.  
However, it is possible that neither agency generates value when both have an idea if agency 1 is 
above agency 2 on the list for one parcel and 2 is above 1 on another.  This brings us to the first 
result. 
CLAIM 1: A crisscross hierarchy is never optimal.  In the two agency case, neither agency should 
be below the other on one list and above on another.   
Note that the model structure rules out both agencies generating value when A is non-
empty.  If both agencies have an idea, at most one agency will be able to implement its idea.  
However, it is possible that neither agency generates value when both have an idea if agency 1 is 
above agency 2 on the list for one parcel and 2 is above 1 on another.  The crisscross hierarchy 
has no effect on the expected value generated when no agency or either agency has an idea, but 
when both agencies have an idea, they both exercise authority over a parcel in conflict.  As a 
result, the total expected value in the two agency case is lower for a crisscross hierarchy than for 
either of the two other arrangements. 
CLAIM 2: In the two agency case with exogenous task selection, the agency with the higher 
value should be senior on all parcels in A.   
As discussed above, seniority only enters the picture when both agencies have ideas.  
Total expected value is higher if, in this case, the agency with higher value has authority over all 
of the parcels it needs.  This result applies only in the 2 agency case and implies that the 
probabilities of having ideas are irrelevant.  The irrelevance of the probabilities of having ideas is 
an artifact of our imposition of exogenous task selection.  Considering endogenous task selection 
gives us one further result.   - 10 -
CLAIM 3: With endogenous task assignment, it is never optimal for the agency with the lower 
probability of having an idea to be junior.   
It seems counter-intuitive that this should be the case, but it is easy to prove by 
contradiction.  Assume the contrary, that in an optimal hierarchy agency 2 has a lower 
probability of having an idea, i.e., p(A2) < p(A1), and that 2 is junior to 1.  By claim 2, v(A2) < 
v(A1), for otherwise agency 2 would be senior.  Therefore task 1 is strictly superior to task 2 as it 
has a higher probability of coming to fruition and a higher value if it does come to fruition.  By 
assumption 7, tasks are chosen at time 0 to maximize total expected value at time 1, and by 
assumption 8 both agencies are capable of performing both tasks.  Therefore, both agencies 
should be working on task 1 simultaneously, thus contradicting our original assumption that the 
hierarchy is optimal.  This result means that seniority should be inversely related to the 
probability of having an idea in an optimal hierarchy, a notion which proves to be generally 
applicable and central to other results. 
Three Agencies.   
We move now to the case of three agencies.  However, at this point we restrict ourselves 
to only two parcels, a1 and a2.  Now there are two distinct classes of tasks; agencies may be 
specialists considering a single parcel, or they may be coordinators considering both parcels.  We 
assume that the probability of having an idea for specialists is ps (regardless of which parcel is 
involved) and that the probability of an idea for a coordinator is pc.  The associated values are vs 
and vc. 
Again, we begin with exogenous task selection: agencies 1 and 2 are specialists, agency 3 
a coordinator.  There are two distinct hierarchy designs as delineated below.  We rule out a third 
design in which the coordinator is senior on one parcel and junior on another as it is never 
optimal.  This is easily shown using the logic applied to crisscross hierarchies in the two agency   - 11 -
case.  The results here hinge on the implicit assumptions that the probabilities of a specialist 
having an idea, ps, and the value (if implemented) generated by a specialist, vs, are identical 
across parcels.  









We can calculate the total expected value at date zero for each hierarchy. 
() ( 1 ) 2 cc c ss Vc s s p v p p v = +−      (2) 
2 () 2 ( 1 ) s ss c c V ssc p v p p v =+ −    (3) 
These expressions are the sums of all the possible values times their respective probabilities.  In 
the 2 task case, this gives us two terms in each expected value.  Combining (2) and (3) yields 
                                           
() () ( 2 ) 2
() () ( 2 ) 2
s cs
s cs
Vc s s Vs s c p v v
V css V ssc p v v
>⇒ − >
<⇒ − <
    (4) 
We are left with three possibilities: i) If vc > 2vs, then the coordinator should be senior regardless 
of ps, since her idea is more valuable than both of the specialists’ ideas combined.  ii) If vs > vc, 
then the specialists should be senior regardless of probabilities, since either one of their ideas 
alone surpasses the value of the coordinator’s idea.  iii) If 2vs > vc > vs, then probabilities play a 
role in the optimal hierarchy design.  In particular, there is a critical value of ps below which the 
coordinator should be senior and above which the specialist should be senior.  Intuitively, we 
only have conflict if the coordinator and at least one specialist have ideas.  In the case of conflict 
it is better for the coordinator to be senior when only one specialist has an idea and better for the   - 12 -
specialists to be senior when they both have ideas.  If ps, which we have assumed to be equal for 
both specialists, is large then it is relatively likely that both specialists will have ideas. 
Notice the distinction between this situation and the one encountered with only two 
agencies.  With exogenous tasks and two agencies, claim 2 told us that only the relation between 
the values affected the optimal hierarchy design.  With three agencies and exogenous tasks, the 
probabilities also impact the optimal design.  There is no analog to claim 2 with three or more 
agencies.   
Moving on to endogenized task selection with three agencies, consider two hierarchies 
sss and ccc, which are detailed below.  Now, these hierarchies are possible in addition to the two 
detailed in Table 1.  Associated with sss and ccc are two expected values, which are also 
provided below.  We maintain the assumption that all specialists have the same probabilities and 
values and extend this assumption to coordinators as well. 
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2 ( ) [1 (1 ) ] s ss s V sss p v p v =−− +       (5) 
                                                  
3 ( ) [1 (1 ) ] cc Vc c c p v =−−      (6) 
In the expression V(sss), the first term represents value generated for parcel 1, which is realized 
if either agency 1 or agency 3 have ideas.  The second term represents the value generated for 
parcel 2 when agency 2 has an idea.  For V(ccc) we have only one term, since the same value vc   - 13 -
is generated unless no one has an idea.  Comparing our four expected value expressions, we can 
derive the following results. 
RESULT 1:   ( ) max[ ( ), ( )] cs p p V ssc V css V sss <⇒ <  
RESULT 2: ( ) max[ ( ), ( )] sc p pV c s s V s s c V c c c <⇒ <  
Notice that both of these results suggest that claim 3 continues to hold in the three agency 
case; namely, it is never optimal for an agency with a lower probability of having an idea to be 
junior.  Interestingly, the relative values are unimportant in these results.  If the probabilities 
meet certain conditions, then we can say that certain hierarchies are suboptimal regardless of the 
values.  Of course, the relative values determine which of the two alternatives is preferable.   
Also notice that we have not ruled out hierarchies in which coordinators are junior to 
specialists.  It is counter-intuitive to have a strategic planner below a specialist in a hierarchy.  
We have two options in order to rule out this possibility.  First, we may assume that vc > 2vs in 
which case strategies favoring the coordinator dominate as shown in (4).  However, this 
assumption is overly restrictive.  We achieve the same result if instead we impose the 
monotonicity condition that pc < ps.  Thinking of the coordinator as a strategic planner, it may 
not be unreasonable to assume that her probability of having an idea using multiple parcels 
would be lower than that of specialists devoted to individual parcels. 
General Results. 
We now consider the model in its most general form: n agencies and m parcels with 
endogenous task selection.  There is one central result which drives all others.  It is a 
generalization of claim 3, which we saw in the 2 agency case and which seemed to hold in the 
three agency case.   - 14 -
LEMMA: In an optimal hierarchy, if p(Aj) < p(Ai), then for any parcel  ki j aAA ∈ ∩ ,  j appears 
above i on list Lk.   
Though this result suggests that only probabilities are important in the optimal delegation 
of authority, values still play a role.  Recall assumption 7, which stated that tasks are assigned at 
time 0 to maximize the time 1 total expected value.  Given optimal task assignment, agencies 
with lower probabilities should be senior.  Tasks with low probabilities must have associated 
high values to justify their assignment in the first place.  For a proof see the appendix of the Hart 
and Moore paper (2005).   
PROPOSITION 1: Crisscross hierarchies are never optimal.  If i appears above j on the list Lk 
associated with parcel ak, then there is no parcel ak’ where i appears below j on the list Lk’.   
This result seems intuitively easy to accept, as crisscross arrangements have the capacity 
to block both agencies involved from generating value.  In fact, when p(Ai) ≠ p(Aj) the above 
lemma precludes crisscross hierarchies.  So the cases of interest occur where p(Ai) = p(Aj).  This 
can occur where the tasks are identical or where the sets Ai and Aj have a non-empty intersection.  
In either case, the result implies that one agency should have authority over all of the parcels that 
both tasks have in common. 
  One particularly interesting situation occurs when  , ij AA ij ⊂≠ , or when j’s task is 
broader in scope than i’s.  In order to derive general results in this situation, we must further 
develop the notion of monotonicity introduced above.  First, define a productive task as one 
associated with a positive value; in an optimal situation, all tasks assigned at time 0 would be 
productive.  Strictly defined, monotonicity requires that for any two productive tasks t(A) and 
t(B), A ≠ B, if A⊂B then p(A) < p(B).   - 15 -
PROPOSITION 2: Assume that we have monotonicity, and consider an optimal hierarchy.  If 
, ij i j AA AA ⊂≠ , then  ki aA ∀∈,  j is above i on list Lk.  This follows directly from the lemma 
and the definition of monotonicity. 
If we are prepared to assume that tasks are nested and the associated values are 
conditionally superadditive, we can develop further results.  Nestedness requires that for task 
t(A) and t(B) either  ,, AB BA ⊂⊂  or  AB ∩ =∅.  Conditional superadditivity requires that the 
value associated with a task t(A) is greater than the sum of the values generated by any partition 
of the parcels in A.  Formally, let 
12 p AA A A = ∪∪ ∪ … .  Then v(A) is conditionally 
superadditive if 
12 () ( ) ( ) ( )
p vA vA vA vA ≥++ + … .  This is the general context analog of the 
condition 2 cs vv ≥  in the 3 agency case.  Nestedness and superadditivity are strong conditions, 
and we discuss their applicability to ecosystem services context in the next section. 
PROPOSITION 3: Assume monotonicity and nestedness.  Then the optimal hierarchy is a 
pyramid, and each agency has the same ranking on every parcel it considers.  In other words, if 
agency j is senior to agency i on one parcel, j should be senior to i on all parcels.   
PROPOSITION 4: Assume nestedness and conditional superadditivity.  Then the optimal 
hierarchy attains first-best. 
Optimal Level of Centralization 
  In the conservation context, the notion of centralization versus decentralization becomes 
important.  Should decisions be made and programs implemented at the national, regional, or 
local level?  Should we have one agency in charge or several working in tandem?  We can think 
of the level of decentralization as increasing in the likelihood that a local specialist will make a 
decision.  To illustrate the implications of the model in this setting, we return to an example with 
only 2 parcels, a1 and a2, and 4 agencies.  Following the 2 agency example, we assume that 
specialists are identical with probability of having an idea ps and value vs.  Likewise, 
coordinators are identical with probability of having an idea pc and value vc.  We also assume   - 16 -
monotonicity, i.e. pc <  ps.  Our general results allow us to rule out crisscross hierarchies and tell 
us that coordinators should be senior to specialists.  Furthermore, the optimal hierarchy will be 
symmetric, or the same number of specialists will work on each parcel.  This leaves us with only 
three possible optimal hierarchies. 








HIERARCHY  C HIERARCHY  D
(centralized) (decentralized)
 
 Hierarchy  C represents a centralized approach.  All 4 agencies think about both parcels, 
thus all 4 are coordinators.  Hierarchy D represents a decentralized approach.  Agencies 1 and 2 
are coordinators, thinking about both parcels; while agencies 3 and 4 each specialize in thinking 
about a particular parcel.  Hierarchy D is less centralized than C because there is a higher 
probability of a local specialist making a decision.  Since C consists of only coordinators, there is 
a zero probability of a specialist implementing an idea.  Under D, however, specialists decide 
how to use both parcels with some non-zero probability when neither coordinating agency has an 
idea.  Under hierarchy T, all agencies are specialists.  Agencies 1 and 3 think about how to use 
parcel a1, while agencies 2 and 4 independently consider how to use parcel a2.  Associated with 
the hierarchies are time 0 expected values. 
    
4 ( ) [1 (1 ) ] cc VC p v =−−      (7) 
   
22 ( ) [1 (1 ) ] (1 ) 2 cc c s s VD p v p p v =−− +−     (8) 
    
2 () 2 [ 1 ( 1 )] s s VI p v =− −      (9)   - 17 -
  If we think of these expected values as functions of vc and hold vs constant, we can plot 
the expected values.  V(C) is positively sloped and passes through the origin.  V(D) has a positive 
intercept and slope; however, it is less steep than V(C).  V(T) is a horizontal line, since it does not 
depend on vc.  It can be easily shown that V(D) intersects the vertical axis below V(T) using the 
fact the probabilities are bounded between 0 and 1.  Furthermore, we can derive a critical value 
of pc where all three lines intersect at a single point. 
    
* 11 cs p p =− −       ( 1 0 )  
  Our critical value varies as we allow ps to vary, and it is bounded below by zero and 
above by ps.  As we allow pc to take on values different from pc
*, we get the two scenarios 
depicted in figure 1.  Since our goal is to maximize expected value, the hierarchy design 
associated with the uppermost line is preferred.  As we vary vc, holding probabilities constant, 
notice that the preferred design changes.  In figure 1a, V(I) is best for small values of vc, but as vc 
increases V(D) and subsequently V(C) are best Also note that when pc > pc
*, hierarchy V(D) is 








  This concludes our development of the model and results of Hart and Moore (2005).  














































(b) pc > pc
*  - 18 -
ecosystem service provision, we maintained the assumptions of the model, some of which 
proved quite restrictive in our case.  In the next section, we reformulate the model in less 
restrictive form and analyze the impact on the results. 
IV. Extensions 
  The key feature of the model is the expected value function given in equation 1.  This 
concise expression accurately reflects time 1 expected value only if the eight assumptions 
presented in section II hold.   Relaxing assumptions will necessitate the formulation of a new 
expected value function.  We are particularly interested in relaxing assumption 2, which states 
that an agency i must have access to all of the parcels in Ai to generate value.  It seems 
implausible that an agency which conserves the bulk of the parcels under consideration generates 
zero value (i.e., has no effect on the level of ecosystem service provision).  To that end, we adapt 
equation 1.  
  When assumption 2 holds, there is only one event in which each agency will generate 
value.  The agency in question must have an idea, and, simultaneously, all senior agencies must 
fail to have an idea.  When we relax this assumption an agency no longer requires all of its 
assigned parcels, and there are many possible value-generating events.  We also must specify 
precisely how the loss of a single parcel (or multiple parcels) affects the value generated.  Thus, 
the expected value function becomes more complicated.   
  We begin with an expression for the expected value from a single agency i.  First we need 
some additional notation.  Let mi be the number of parcels in Ai.  Let p-i be the probability of 
conflict on any single parcel in Ai.  By conflict, we mean that a senior agency uses the parcel in 
question, and agency i does not.  At this point we assume that p-i is constant across all parcels in   - 19 -
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p p probability of conflict on exactly one parcel
p p probability of conflict on exactly two parcels
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  The expected value for agency i is given by equation 11, where γ represents the share of 
the value v(Ai) realized if agency i implements its idea on all the parcels in Ai but one.  This 
parameter can take values between zero and one.  The share of the value realized when all but n 
parcels are conserved is then γ
n.  For simplicity, we replace p(Ai) and v(Ai), the probability of 
agency i having an idea and the associated value, with pi and vi.  These quantities apply for every 
event faced by agency i and therefore precede the brackets.   
  Each term in the brackets represents a class of events defined by a particular number of 
parcels in conflict, beginning with zero and ending with mi -1.  Each term consists of a weighting 
factor reflecting the number of possible realizations of the event as well as the probability of the 
event and the share of the full value generated.  For the weights, we use the combination 
operator, which gives us the number of different ways of selecting a given number of conflict 
parcels from the mi parcels in Ai.  The first bracketed term has weight  0 1
i m C =  and share γ
0 = 1.  
Also note that we do not include the event where all mi parcels are in conflict.  An agency 
generates zero value if it does not have access to any parcels. 
     
11 1
11 (1 ) (1 ) (1 )
ii i i i i
i
mm m m m m
ii i i i i mi i Vp v p C p p Cp p γγ
−− −
−− − − − − ⎡⎤ =− + − + + − ⎣⎦ …  (11) 




ii i i i i i m i Vp v p p p v C p γ γ −− − =− + −  (12)   - 20 -
  We can simplify equation 11, as it is a binomial expansion of equation 12.  We include 
the final term in equation 12 to account for the term left out of the brackets in equation 11.   
  As mentioned above, for a single agency, p-i is constant across parcels.  Specifically, we 
define this probability as a function of the probabilities of having an idea associated with every 
agency senior to i on one or more parcels, here pj.  Let Ji be the number of agencies senior to i.  
Then,  12 (, , , , , ) , [ 1 , ]
i ij J i p fp p p p j J − =∈ …… .  Moreover, the probability of conflict should 
be increasing in the probability of a senior agency having an idea, thus  / 0 ij pp − ∂ ∂≥ . 
  Aggregating equation 12 across all n agencies gives us our total expected value.  We drop 
the weight from the last term in equation 13 since it is equal to unity.  Notice that if γ = 0, this 
expression reverts to one quite similar to equation 1.  No value is generated in the case of 
conflict. 






ii i i ii i
ii
Vp vp p p v p γ γ −− −
==
=− + − ∑∑  (13) 
  We have relaxed assumption 2 and developed an alternative total value function that is 
more appropriate for the ecosystem services context.  Unfortunately, by introducing many more 
possible value-generating events, we have muddied the water and cannot derive many of the 
precise results proved under all assumptions.  For example, since conflict on a single parcel no 
longer blocks the generation of value by both parties, crisscross hierarchies may be optimal.  
Future efforts will focus on deriving results based on our new value function. 
  Furthermore, though we relaxed one assumption, we have also added two new 
assumptions.  Both impose some degree of homogeneity on the parcels being considered.  First, 
for each agency i, the probability of conflict is assumed to be equal across all parcels in Ai.    - 21 -
Though necessary for tractability, this assumption is not particularly realistic, given that the 
probabilities are known and authority structure specified in time 0.   
  Second, we assume that each unavailable parcel has the same impact on the value, 
namely the multiplicative factor γ.  On a large enough scale, this may be a reasonable 
assumption.  On a smaller scale, it may be problematic.  More importantly, this assumption does 
not account for many of the relevant features of ecosystem services identified in the literature 
(e.g. threshold effects or joint production).  Under threshold effects we should see large 
differences in the share of value generated as we move around some critical mass of parcels.  
With joint production, it is possible that one agency could realize full value even in the face of 
conflict if the senior agency put the conflict parcel(s) to a compatible use.   
.  There is a gap in the literature pertaining to the optimal design of an institutional 
structure to govern interactions between multiple agencies engaged in promoting the provision of 
ecosystem services.  Certainly the hypothesis that alternative hierarchies between agencies may 
have significantly different welfare effects warrants investigation.  The considerable losses due 
to sub-optimal targeting strategies in individual programs have been well documented.  The 
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